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SEX, LIES, AND LAWSUITS: A NEW MEXICO
PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO WARN THIRD PARTIES WHO
UNKNOWINGLY MAY BE AT RISK OF CONTRACTING
HIV FROM A PATIENT
INTRODUCTION
The Hippocratic Oath states, in part, "[aill that may come to my
knowledge in the exercise of my profession or outside of my profession
or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be spread abroad,
I will keep secret and will never reveal."' At one time, all physicians
were presumed to have taken this oath before receiving their license to
practice. Although many of the strictures contained within the Oath are
at variance with current medical practices and needs of society, 2 the
central and most admirable feature of the Oath, the respect it generates
for the patient, is readily apparent in current medical creeds.' The public
relies on this respect as a guarantee of privacy and confidentiality when
disclosing medical information to a physician during medical treatment.
At the same time, however, people expect physicians to notify them
about preventative measures to avoid contracting disease and also to
warn them when they might be at risk for disease.
In an effort to mitigate public expectations, both courts and legislatures
4
have recognized a duty in the medical profession to maintain confidentiality
as well as a duty to warn third parties at risk of infection.' Judicial and
statutory guidelines, however, are often ambiguous. Without clear legal
guidelines, the physician must rely on his or her own intuition to resolve
the apparent dilemma between confidentiality and potential protection of
third parties. Clouding this intuition, however, are a physician's emotional
involvement and ethical obligations. Moreover, whichever way the physician decides to resolve the dilemma inevitably invites litigation.
The emergence of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has
intensified the conflict between a physician's duty to maintain confiden-

1. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 768 (28th ed. 1994).
2. See John H. Leversee, HippocratesRevisited: A View from General Practice, in HIPPOCRATES
REVISITED 95-100 (Bulger ed., 1973) (recognizing that the Oath's positions on abortion and the right
to die are increasingly outdated).
3. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF GENEVA, World Medical Association (1948) (utilized during
the University of New Mexico School of Medicine's commencement ceremonies, "I will respect the
secrets which are confided to me").
4. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965)
(recognizing a physician's duty to maintain patient confidentiality); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-20
(Repl. Pamp. 1994) (mandating confidentiality of medical information).
5. See, e.g., Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928) (allowing a breach of patient confidentiality in favor of warning a third party of a contagious disease); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-8
(Repl. Pamp. 1994) (mandating disclosure to public health officials of unethical behavior endangering
others).
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tiality and a duty to warn third parties at risk of infection. Disclosing
the medical history of a person with AIDS is in itself a distressing
occurrence. However, a breach of confidentiality through disclosure can
ostracize a patient's family and friends, as well as provoke discrimination
in employment and housing. 6 Failing to warn an unsuspecting person
about exposure to the virus, however, can lead to contraction of the
disease, which is currently incurable. Instead of facing the impossibility
of resolving this dilemma, a physician may refuse to treat patients infected
with AIDS.
In New Mexico, a physician has a statutory duty to keep HIV-related
information confidential. 7 The legislature has also recognized a physician's
duty to warn third parties who may be at risk because of a patient's
behavior.' Notwithstanding the recognition of a physician's duty to warn
and to maintain confidentiality in New Mexico, a great deal of uncertainty
currently exists as to the legal status of warnings to third parties. Physicians in New Mexico are left to resolve individually the conflict between
protection of third parties and patient confidentiality and face potential
liability for their decision. Without clear legal guidelines, physicians may
refuse to treat HIV infected patients, the availability of medical treatment
for AIDS patients may decrease, and statewide medical costs will increase.
This paper examines the conflict between a physician's duties of confidentiality and protection in New Mexico. Part I examines the medical
and statistical background of AIDS. The next section reviews physicianpatient confidentiality, including the need for confidentiality and the legal
basis behind the confidentiality, in the specific context of AIDS. Part
III examines the existence and scope of judicially and statutorily recognized
exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality. Specifically, mandatory
reporting statutes and contagious disease and mental illness cases from
other jurisdictions will be considered. Part IV discusses physician-patient
confidentiality and its recognized exceptions in New Mexico. Section V
analyzes a New Mexico physician's current duty to third parties who
may be in'danger of contracting HIV from a physician's patient. Although
it is unlikely that a physician will be held liable for failing to disclose
AIDS-related information to third parties in New Mexico, possible suggestions for clarifying the physician's duty are presented in the conclusion.

6. See generally Lawrence Gostin et al., The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of
Court and Human Rights Commission Decisions, Part II: Discrimination, 263 JAMA 2086 (1990).
7. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (mandating confidentiality of HIV
related information). See also infra part IV.B.1.
8. See Wilchinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989) (recognizing a physician's
duty to the driving public when administering narcotics to his patients in his office). See also infra
part IV.B.2.
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I. AIDS - THE DISEASE 9
In 1981, the United States Center for Disease Control (CDC)' 0 officially
reported the first case of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). 1
Although there is evidence that AIDS may have existed before that time,
the United States and other countries have now been dealing with the
disease for more than ten years. At the end of 1981, there were only
189 documented AIDS cases.' 2 In contrast, by January 1994, approximately 361,164 people in the United States had been diagnosed with
AIDS, 3 with more than forty percent having already died as a result of
the disease.' 4 The World Health Organization predicts that by the year
2000, there will be 40 million HIV-infected men, women, and children
in the world."5
AIDS is a devastating and fatal disease. It is not a single disease, in
itself, but rather the culminating infection of various life threatening
diseases, infections and cancers.' 6 This group of diseases and infections
is the result of a virus that impairs the body's immune system, rendering
it ineffective. The virus has become known as Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV). 17 To combat infection, the human body's immune system
relies heavily upon a category of blood cells known as CD4-T lymphocytes. 18 HIV depletes or impairs CD4-T cells. 19 Consequently, as CD4T cell depletion occurs, the immune system becomes unresponsive, resulting in the body's susceptibility to opportunistic infections and other
9. This is not meant to be a detailed discussion of AIDS. It is only meant to provide the
reader with the knowledge necessary to understand this paper. For a more comprehensive discussion
of AIDS, see AIDS TESTING: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE To TECHNICAL, MEDICAL, SOCIAL, LEGAL,
AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES (Gerald Schochetman & J. Richard George eds., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter
AIDS TESTING]; B.D. SCHOUB, AIDS A D HIV IN PERSPECTIVE: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE
VIRUS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1994) [hereinafter SCHOUB].
10. Since its detection, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) has monitored and defined the
progress of HIV. In 1987, the CDC defined the progress of the virus from the moment of initial
infection through four general stages. Centers for Disease Control, Revision of the CDC Surveillance
Case Definition for AIDS, 36 Mortality & Morbidity Weekly Rep. No. IS (1987). In January 1993,
the CDC adopted an expanded AIDS case definition that took into account severe immunosuppression
per se and added recurrent bacterial pneumonia, pulmonary tuberculosis, and invasive cervical
carcinoma in HIV seropositive people to the long list of AIDS-defining conditions. Centers for
Disease Control, 1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance
Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep.
RR 17 (1992). Because most of the current legislation was enacted previous to the 1993 re-classification,
this paper will rely primarily on the prior CDC AIDS definition.
11. See SCHOUB, supra note 9, at 2. AIDS was previously referred to as Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome. See generally AIDS AND THE LAW 26 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987).
12. CDC, The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First 10 Years, 40 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep.
357, 358 (1991) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS Epidemic].
13. CDC, Summary of Notifiable Disease, United States 1993, 42 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly
Rep. 15 (1994). There was a significant increase from 1992 to 1993, attributable to the CDC's
revised classification expanding the definition of people with AIDS. See supra note 10.
14. Id. at 15.
15. See HIV/AIDS Epidemic, supra note 12, at 357.
16. See SCHOUB, supra note 9, at 23-31.
17. See, e.g., id. at 19.
18. See AIDS TESTING, supra note 9, at 35 (stating "CD4T cells are a pivotal cell in the
orchestration of an effective immune response").
19. Id. at 32.
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disorders. 20 Opportunistic infections arise from organisms normally found
but not usually harmful to those with healthy immune
in the environment,
2
'
systems.
A.

HIV Testing

Currently, there is no test available to confirm the presence of HIV
itself. 22 Tests primarily detect the presence of antibodies that have developed in a person's body to fight off HIV infection. Of these, the
two most widely known are the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
technique (ELISA) and the Western Blot test. 23 Due to its short incubation
period, the ELISA is usually the first test to be performed on a blood
sample. Although results are generally available within twenty-four hours,24
the ELISA is known to produce a high level of false positive results.
The Western blot has an extremely low rate of error, but is more expensive
25
and has a much longer incubation period. Normal medical procedure
involves performing the Western blot test only after two successive ELISA
tests return positive. 26 People who test positive are presumed capable of
transmitting the infection to others.
B.

Latency Period and Symptoms

A related problem with the HIV tests is the latency period associated
with the detection of HIV antibodies. Currently, there is no way of27
determining whether HIV-positive people will eventually contract AIDS,
or how long the process may take, as the time between exposure and
2
onset of symptoms varies from six months to more than ten years. As
a result of the latency period, symptoms often vary significantly.
Within a month or two of contracting the virus, many people exhibit
symptoms similar to mononucleosis or the flu, such as fever, headaches,
night sweats, and diarrhea. 29 During this time, infected people do not
test positive for HIV, as the body does not start producing antibodies
to HIV until sometime after the second month. This creates difficulty

20. Id.
21. See SCHOUB, supra note 9, at 25-26.
22. The development of an accurate test not for antibodies, but for the virus itself will dramatically
change standards for such testing by eliminating the problem of the "window period" between
infection and production of antibodies.
23. See AIDS TESTING, supra note 9, at 54.
24. See id. at 56-57. False positives are the result of the nature of the test and its relatively
short incubation period of four to six hours. In studies of non-high risk group participants, as
many as nine out of ten test results returned false positive. Id.
25. Id. at 57-59.
26. H. Alten et. al., Determination of the Prevalence of HIV-1 p24 Antigen in United States
Blood Donors and an Assessment of the Potential Efficacy of this Market for Blood Screening,
323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1312, 1317 (1990).
27. It is assumed that all HIV infections lead to AIDS, but this has not been proven.
28. RON BROOKMEYER & MITCHELL H. GAIL, AIDS EPIDEMIOLOGY: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH
111 (1994).
29. MARTIN GUNDERSON ET AL., AIDS: TESTING AND PRIVACY 15-16 (Margaret P. Battin et al.
eds., 1989).
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in early identification of HIV because even people suspicious that the
early flu-like illness may be HIV related will not test positive right away.
Shortly thereafter, individuals test positive for HIV, but often remain
asymptomatic.3 0 Thus, a person in seemingly good health could be a
carrier of HIV for some time without realizing it. With no symptoms
to indicate the presence of the disease, an HIV-positive person may infect
numerous others by foregoing the precautions necessary to prevent the
spread of the disease.
As the immune system deteriorates, symptoms begin to materialize.
Typically, an infected person first notices a loss of energy.31 Additional
symptoms include generalized lymph node swelling, fevers, diarrhea, and
weight loss.32 The body also begins to require more sleep and may
experience a lack of resistance to infection. These symptoms, however,
could indicate many common illnesses and do not necessarily imply HIVinfection.
When the immune system becomes more susceptible to secondary infections, such as Kaposi's sarcoma, pneumocystic pneumonia, and lymphoma, the infected person is considered to be in the advanced stages
of AIDS. At this point, HIV has destroyed most of the body's white
blood cells, leaving the host's ineffective immune system defenseless to
opportunistic infections.33
C. Transmission
HIV is not an airborne virus and is not transmitted through casual
contact such as hugging or shaking hands. The virus can only be transmitted from one individual to another through blood products, bodily
secretions, or fluids.3 4 Thus, individuals who share intravenous drug
needles, who engage in unprotected sex, who have had a blood transfusion,
who have had a blood splash or a stick with a medical instrument with
infected blood on it, or who are born to HIV positive or AIDS infected
mothers have been known to contract HIV.35 However, outside of having
unprotected sex, sharing intravenous needles, and being born to or breastfeeding from an infected mother, the risk of transmission approaches
zero.3 6 Thus, sexual partners and people who share intravenous needles
37
are considered high-risk groups for contracting the HIV infection.

30. Id. at 16.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 16-17 (these conditions formerly defined AIDS-related complex (ARC)).
33. All states require the reporting of a diagnosis of AIDS to public health authorities. Originally,
most AIDS legislation only recognized this final full-blown stage for public health reporting purposes,
but statutes now require reporting of the disease even when asymptomatic or exhibiting only mild
symptoms. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1402 (West 1990) (requiring a report in writing
to the state or local department of health on every individual known to have a HIV related illness).
Cf. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1402.5 (researchers conducting HIv-related medical research
exempt from reporting requirement) (effective July 1, 1994).
34. See generally SCHOUB, supra note 9, at 91-120.
35. See Larry 0. Gostin, A Decade of a Maturing Epidemic: An Assessment and Directions
for Future Public Policy, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 7 (1990).
36. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, AIDS: IMOAES OF THE EPIDEMIc 9 (1994).
37. Gostin, supra note 35, at 11.
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D. Prevention and Cure
Presently there is no known cure for the HIV infection or AIDS
The virus has the ability to mutate in certain genes, producing a modified
protein coat.3 9 Mutation severely reduces the likelihood of creating an
effective vaccine because vaccines that can effectively combat a particular
viral strain may not protect against the mutated strain with its altered
protein coat.40 Thus, once a person has HIV, treatments are limited to
alleviating symptoms. Different drugs have been introduced as treatments, 41 but they are all still in the experimental stages. 42 As a result,
infection
it is generally agreed that early treatment of asymptomatic HIV
4
can be advantageous in the prevention or delay of illness. 1
II.

PHYSICIAN-PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

Physician-patient confidentiality is an integral part of medical treatment
for many reasons. The various implications of AIDS heightens the role
of confidentiality in medical treatment. Although the integrity of the
medical profession is directly dependent on the ability of physicians to
maintain confidentiality, state legislatures" and courts 45 currently impose
a legal duty on physicians to maintain confidentiality.
The Need for Confidentiality
Confidentiality between physicians and patients serves several purposes.
First, confidentiality encourages patients to be completely truthful with
their physicians and to provide all information necessary for treatment,
including embarrassing and humiliating problems. Second, confidentiality
ensures that sensitive medical conditions that patients wish to remain
private are not disclosed in an effort to protect patients from potential
mistreatment due to people's prejudices and fears of disease.
Maintaining doctor-patient confidentiality in the context of AIDS is
essential for compassionate treatment of those infected with HIV. In
addition to horrific diseases and the unavailability of a cure, individuals
infected with HIV face social opprobrium and discrimination due to
irrational fears and prejudices. Persons with AIDS and those only suspected of having it, including children, have not only lost the support
of friends and family, but have also been denied housing, employment,

A.

38. See, e.g., HIV INFECTION: A CLINICA . MAN UAL 34 (Howard Libman & Robert A. Witzburg
eds., 2d ed. 1993).
39. Scaoun, supra note 9, at 189.
40. Id.
41. In 1987, the FDA approved azidovudine (AZT) for use in the treatment of the virus itself.
AIDS IN THE WORLD 233-34 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1992). In 1991, ddI was approved.
Id. Both drugs inhibit an enzyme in the HIV from replicating itself. The FDA has also approved
a third drug, ddC, for use in combination with AZT. Id.
42. See id. at 234, 238 (discussing different combinations of drugs and treatment timing).
43. See SCHOUB, supra note 9, at 177.
44. See infra part II.B.1 (discussing statutory basis for physician-patient confidentiality).
45. See infra part II.B.2 (discussing judicial basis for physician-patient confidentiality).
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insurance, and admission to schools.4 As a result, persons at risk for
HIV have strong grounds for desiring personal privacy and confidentiality
of medical information.
Discrimination against people with AIDS consequently affects the health
care community's ability to provide an effective program of preventing
and controlling AIDS. Because there is presently no cure for AIDS, the
only way to curb the advancement of the disease is by educating those
who are uninfected about preventative measures, and initiating behavioral
changes in those infected and those in the high-risk groups. Education
and counseling form the foundation for behavioral change. The publichealth community must ascertain who is infected and at high risk in
order to provide education and counseling to the proper people.
In addition to education and counseling, volunteer testing is also an
integral part of an effective program of preventing and controlling AIDS.
Volunteer testing usually takes one of two forms: anonymous and confidential. 47 During anonymous testing, a person receives a number in lieu
of disclosing his or her identity.4 8 Results are dispersed according to that
number. 49 Confidential testing, on the other hand, does not displace a
person's identity, but rather relies on a procedure to insure that the
person's identity as well as test results will remain confidential. 0 Because
volunteer testing necessarily leads to early detection and treatment of
HIV at the same time ensures a level of trust in health-care providers
responsible for providing needed treatment, maintaining confidentiality
is essential. Because of discrimination and stigma, however, people will
not participate in volunteer testing if they feel that test results or information will not remain confidential. Thus, successful efforts aimed
at controlling the AIDS virus and preventing its spread necessarily depend
upon confidentiality of medical information.
Recognizing the need to ensure patient privacy, the CDC has published
a list of suggestions for reducing further transmission of AIDS." In this
list, the CDC recommends that doctors provide more protection of patient
confidentiality. 2 Similarly, the American Hospital Association has recommended that hospitals take special care to ensure the confidentiality
of information pertaining to the treatment of AIDS patients." Additionally, the American Medical Association has called for legislation to

46. See Gostin, supra note 6, at 2086-87.
47. See generally RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 121 (1989); RONALD
VALDISERRI, PREVENTING AIDS 219-45 (1989).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See CDC, Additional Recommendations to Reduce Sexual and Drug Related Transmission
of Human T-lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphodenopathy-Associated Virus, 35 Morbidity &
Mortality Weekly Rep. 152 (1986).
52. Id.
53. See American Hospital Ass'n, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON AIDS/HIV INFECTION POLICY (1988).
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unless withholding the
protect the confidentiality of antibody test results
4
health.1
public
the
threaten
would
results
test
B. Legal Recognition of Physician-PatientConfidentiality
Implied in the Hippocratic Oath," the duty of confidentiality subsequently began only as an ethical requirement. Indeed, the elevated integrity
of the medical profession appears to have been built on physicians' ability
to maintain confidentiality. Eventually, however, courts and legislatures
began to recognize the existence of the duty of confidentiality, and have
held physicians liable for failing to protect a patient's confidentiality.

1. Statutory Recognition
Nationwide, state legislatures have imposed a legal requirement upon
physicians to maintain patient confidentiality. 6 Most confidentiality sta-

tutes impose an obligation on physicians to maintain the confidentiality
of their patients' medical records or files. 5 7 The statutory duty of con-

fidentiality includes not only the physician, but also anyone else who
comes in contact with the records. 8 Some states also recognize a physicianpatient privilege, which protects information disclosed to a physician by
a patient from being made public during any type of legal or administrative

proceeding.

9

The ability to waive this privilege resides solely with the

patient or his representative. 60 Due to the personal nature of the infor-

mation involved, many states provide specific statutory protection for
information regarding contagious and sexually transmitted diseases. 6'

State legislatures, however, do not usually classify HIV infection as a
sexually transmitted disease for purposes of confidentiality statutes. To
clarify this situation, most states have passed legislation specifically pro-

54. See American Medical Ass'n, Prevention and Control of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An Interim Report, 258 JAMA 2097 (1987).
55. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 56.10 (West Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. III,
§ 70E(b) (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504 (1992).
57. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. § 56.10(a) (prohibiting disclosure of "medical information"); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I I § 70E(b) (mandating confidentiality of "all records and communications");
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(a) (requiring a "patient's health care information" remain confidential);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504(a)(1) (mandating confidentiality of "the medical records of patients").
58. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 56.10(a) (extending duty to "provider of health care"); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I l, § 70E (extending duty to patients of any hospital, institution for the
care of unwed mothers, clinic, infirmary, convalescent or nursing home, rest home or charitable
home for the aged); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-3 (extending duty to any "health care provider");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504 (extending duty to state, county and municipal hospitals and medical
facilities).
59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (Harrison Supp. 1994) (psychotherapist-patient); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (West 1991) (physician-patient); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (Supp. 1994)
(physician-patient); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1994) (physician-patient); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.235 (1988) (psychologist-patient); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (Supp. 1995) (psychiatrist-patient).
60. See supra note 59.
61. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § I IA-22 (1992); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120705 (West Supp.
1996); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-402 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 711 (1995);
35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 521.15 (1993).
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tecting the confidentiality of HIV-related information. 62 HIV confidentiality statutes broadly protect the identity of individuals seeking an HIV
test, their seropositive status, and their medical records. 63 Accordingly,
confidentiality statutes encourage people to participate in voluntary testing,
which, in turn, enables state public health officials to accumulate data
necessary for prevention and education.
2. Common Law Recognition
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized an implied
constitutional right to privacy, 64 under which a patient's right to confidentiality would seemingly fall, the concept of a constitutional right to
privacy still remains largely undefined. The Supreme Court has held that
65
a person's medical records fall within the constitutional zone of privacy.
Additionally, a federal court in Missouri, citing earlier state cases, held
that the right to privacy includes the right to have medical information
kept confidential from the general public. 66 Even though the Supreme
Court has not explicitly held that the constitutional right to privacy
protects an individual from unlimited disclosure of personal information,
individual state courts have long recognized a common law right to
physician-patient confidentiality .67
Cases awarding damages as a result of a physician's disclosure of
information illustrate the existence of a legally recognized duty of
physician-patient confidentiality at common law. Courts have based

62. See, e.g., CAL.

§ 120820 (West Supp. 1996);

FLA STAT.

ANN.

§ 381.004(3)(f) (Harrison Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §24-9-47(b)(1) (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN.

STAT.

HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE

ch. 410, para. 305, § 9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAw § 2782(1) (McKinney
1993).
63. See supra note 62.
64. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that the use of contraceptives
between married couples lies "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (holding the Fourth Amendment to create
a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to
the people").
65. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977).
66. See Mikal v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591, 597 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd mem., 716 F.2d 907
(8th Cir. 1983) (although a person is entitled to know the medical status of his or her spouse).
67. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Ohio 1965), aff'd
on reh'g, 243 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ohio 1965) (holding that patient stated a cause of action against
an insurance company who allegedly induced physician to divulge medical information of the patient);
Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920) (holding that a physician had a duty not to
divulge information concerning treatment of patient's syphilis, but allowed a narrow exception to
prevent spread of disease to identifiable individuals); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1962)
(holding that physician who obtained information about a patient's new infant had a duty not to
disclose frivolously the information); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding
that physician's descriptions of patient information in a book of case studies, although anonymous,
is actionable); Clark v. Geraci, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (holding that patient stated
a cause of action against armed forces physician who divulged patient's alcoholism, but disallowed
recovery because patient had authorized partial disclosure); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of
Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985) (holding that a mother had a cause of action against her physician
after he divulged her identity to her biological daughter put up for adoption at birth); Berry v.
Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah 1958) (holding that a physician's disclosure of a patient's medical
information to another physician for nonmedical reasons was actionable).

490
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recovery against physicians for breach of patient confidentiality on
a variety of theories. Patients have asserted a variety of causes of
action against physicians for unauthorized disclosures of information,
including implied statutory law, 68 breach of implied contract,6 9 and
invasion of privacy. 70 Courts are more willing to recognize a duty to
maintain this confidentiality when there are state laws which indicate
the public policy behind the duty. 7' Additionally, courts have also begun
to recognize an emerging tort, breach of confidentiality,72 which specifically allows a patient a cause of action for a physician's breach of
confidentiality. The establishment of the distinct tort of breach of patient
confidentiality indicates the state courts' willingness to recognize a duty
of confidentiality and demonstrates just how far the courts will go to
find a physician liable for a breach.
In Simonsen v. Swenson, 73 for example, the Nebraska Supreme Court
relied on the theory of implied statutory law when it recognized that the
"relation of physician and patient is necessarily a highly confidential one." ' 74
In Simonsen, after treating his patient for syphilis, a physician disclosed
the information to the owners of the hotel where his patient was staying. 71
The court sustained a cause of action against a doctor for wrongful
divulgence and based its decision upon that portion of a state medical
licensing statute. 76 According to the statute, a physician's license could be
revoked, under the terms of the statute, for any unauthorized or unprivileged
betrayal of communication." The Simonsen court noted that the statute
at issue constituted a sufficient expression of public policy to support a
cause of action against a physician who betrayed a patient's confidences. 78
Additionally, in Berry v. Moench, 79 parents, distraught over their daughter's plans to marry plaintiff, asked their family doctor to investigate

68. See Hammonds, 237 F. Supp. at 101-02 (stating that requirement in state medical licensing
statute precluding disclosure of confidential information implied duty of confidentiality); Simonsen
v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920) (holding that state statute mandating professional conduct
of physician implied duty of confidentiality); Geraci, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (holding that duty of
secrecy was implied by state statutory law).
69. See Hammonds, 237 F. Supp. at 98 (recognizing a breach of contract cause of action after
physician stopped treating patient following disclosure of patient's prior medical information); Hague,
181 A.2d at 349 (holding that after patient contracts with defendant for services, the physician is
under a duty not to disclose information regarding the services); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668,
674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding that a relationship between a physician and patient establishes
a contractual relationship with a duty to maintain confidence); Humphers, 696 P.2d at 536 (recognizing
that a contract claim may be adequate where the breach of confidence causes financial loss).
70. See Home v. Patton, 287 So.2d 824, 831-32 (Ala. 1973). See also Humphers, 696 P.2d 527,
531 (identifying plaintiff's interest in confidentiality as a privacy interest).
71. Hammonds, 237 F. Supp. at 101 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("statutes of Ohio contain both basic
expressions of public policy which have persuaded these other courts [Simonsen, Berry, and Clark]").
72. See Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 670-71; cf. Humphers, 696 P.2d at 533.
73. 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920).
74. Id. at 832.
75. Id.
76. Id.(relying on NEB. REv. ST. § 2721 (1913)).
77. Id. (citing NEB. REv. STAT. § 2721 (1913)).
78. See id.
79. 331 P.2d 814 (Utah 1958).

Summer 19961

PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO WARN ABOUT HIV

plaintiff's background. 80 The doctor contacted the defendant, a psychiatrist
who had treated plaintiff seven years earlier. 8 Defendant's response
disclosed the details of plaintiff's therapy, which included electric shock
treatment, and advised the daughter to "run as fast and far as she
possibly could in any direction away from him." 2 The Utah Supreme
Court held that a cause of action existed against the doctor for the
of
wrongful disclosures. The court based its decision on a public policy
83
non-disclosure implied in Utah's privileged communication statute.
Courts also have recognized a physician's duty to maintain confiden84
tiality based on an implied contract between the physician and the patient,
or based on a general duty not to disclose.85 In Hammonds v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.,86 for instance, a federal district court in Ohio
stated that even if there is no statute creating a duty of confidentiality,
public policy implies a duty of "implied secrecy" in the physician-patient
relationship. 87 The court went on to find three theories for holding
physicians liable for the unjustified disclosure of confidential information,
even without a statute: breach of contract, breach of a fiduciary rela88
tionship, and breach of an implied promise of secrecy or confidentiality.
A more recent example involved a book of case studies that a psychiatrist
and her psychologist husband published for popular as well as scientific
consumption.8 9 The book contained biographical details and verbatim
disclosures of a former patient including descriptions of her thoughts,
emotions, and intimate fantasiesP ° The patient was a university professor,
whom friends, colleagues, and students were able to identify from the
material in the book. In searching for a theory of liability, the court
discussed implied statutory cause of action, tort, and implied contract,
but ultimately held that this disclosure was an actionable breach of
confidence based in tort. 9'

80. Id.at 816.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 817 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1953) (providing that a physician cannot be
examined as to any information acquired in attending his patient)).
84. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 98 (N.D. Ohio
1965)(recognizing a breach of contract cause of action after physician stopped treating patient
following disclosure of patient's prior medical information); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349
(N.J. 1962) (holding that after patient contracts with defendant for services, the physician is under
a duty not to disclose information regarding the services); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding that a relationship between a physician and patient establishes a
contractual relationship with a duty to maintain confidence); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of
Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 527-29 (Or. 1985) (recognizing that a contract claim may be adequate where
the breach of confidence causes financial loss).
85. A physician is "under a general duty not to disclose frivolously the information received
from [the patient] or from an examination of the patient." Hague, 181 A.2d at 349 (emphasis
added).
86. 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
87. Id. at 102.
88. Id. at 98.
89. See Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1977).
90. See id.at 671.
91. Id.at 676.
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More recently, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized the physicianpatient confidentiality by establishing the tort of breach of confidential
relationship. 92 In Humphers v. First InterstateBank of Oregon,93 a mother
who had given up her daughter for adoption just after her birth brought
an action against the physician who had delivered her daughter, and
subsequently helped reveal the mother's identity to the daughter. 94 The
mother sought relief under two different theories: breach of a confidential
or privileged relationship and invasion of privacy. 9 The court held that
the mother had no cause of action under the invasion of privacy theory,
but she could proceed against the physician for breach of confidence in
a confidential relationship. 96
Physician-patient confidentiality has only recently been applied in the
context of AIDS. 97 In Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton,9" the
estate of a surgeon diagnosed with AIDS at a hospital later brought a
cause of action against the hospital for breach of the AIDS information."
At the time of the diagnosis, the plaintiff was also a member of the
surgical staff of the hospital.' °° After discovering that he had AIDS, the
plaintiff decided to have treatment administered at home in an effort to
prevent his diagnosis from becoming public.' 01 However, upon returning
home, the plaintiff received many phone calls from practitioners inquiring
about both his health and the health of his companion. 10 2 A month after
diagnosis, plaintiff returned to his office practice. 03 Although plaintiff
took steps to minimize disclosure to his patients, he began receiving
patient cancellations, requests for records, and resignations from longtime employees. 1°4 During the next two years, until his death, plaintiff's
office practice diminished at a very high rate. 0 5
At trial, plaintiff could not identify specifically the actual sources of
the disclosure of his diagnosis. However, plaintiff argued that the medical
center's failure to implement meaningful restrictions on access to his
medical records was sufficient to establish liability.' 6 The court stated
that it "makes little difference to identify those who 'spread the news,"'

92. See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 536 (Or. 1985).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 527-28.
95. Id. at 528.
96. Id. at 533.
97. See e.g., Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991) (recognizing duty of health care providers to maintain confidentiality of AIDSinfected surgeon); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990) (recognizing
violation of Fourteenth Amendment after police officer disclosed AIDS infection of family members).
98. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1991).
99. Id. at 1257.
100. Id. at 1256.
101. Id. at 1256.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1257.
105. Id.
106. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1268.
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when such sensitive information was made so readily available. 0 7 The
court held that the hospital's failure to take reasonable steps to maintain
the confidentiality of plaintiff's medical records was a breach of the
08
medical center's duty and obligation to keep such records confidential.
Based on the Behringer decision, it appears that the public's perception
of AIDS will be an integral factor towards a determination of a duty
of physician-patient confidentiality in the context of AIDS.' °9 Because of
the stigma and discrimination surrounding AIDS, courts will possibly be
more critical of normal protocols attempting to ensure confidentiality." 0
As a result, physicians treating patients suffering from AIDS could be
scrutinized more closely in actions brought by patients for a breach of
confidential information.
III.

EXCEPTIONS TO PHYSICIAN-PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

Courts generally agree that a physician's duty to maintain the confidentiality of information acquired through the physician-patient relationship is not absolute."' Disclosure of information by physicians has been

confidentiality conflicts with the
approved in situations in which strict
11 2

"supervening interests of society.
Under such circumstances, a physician has a qualified privilege to disclose confidential information. Circumstances that qualify as supervening interests of society, however, have
been narrowly interpreted." 3
It is clear that society views AIDS with significant concern. It is not
certain, however, whether AIDS would qualify as a. supervening interest
enabling a doctor to override the physician-patient confidentiality in favor
of disclosure to a third party. Proponents of requiring a physician to
warn third parties argue that because AIDS is incurable, the failure to

107. Id. at 1273.
108. Id. at 1274.
109. See Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1269-74 (discussing the implications of AIDS in a determination
of duty to maintain confidentiality).
110. See id. at 1271-72 (analyzing hospital's normal record keeping procedures).
111. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) ("[n]o patient can expect
that if his malady is found to be of a dangerously contagious nature he can still require it to be
kept secret from those to whom, if there was no disclosure, such disease would be transmitted");
Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1962) ("not to say that the patient enjoys an absolute
right"); Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1268 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1991) ("[n]otwithstanding the strong policy in favor of the physician-patient privilege and the ensuing
obligation of confidentiality, exceptions to the privilege have been widely recognized"); Clark v.
Geraci, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) ("Itlhe delicate balance of conflicting duties
must thus be weighed ... to determine the doctor's paramount duty"); Humphers v. First Interstate
Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 535 (Or. 1985) ("[plhysicians . . . also may be legally obliged to
report medical information to others ..."); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1958) ("the
responsibility of the doctor to keep confidence may be outweighed by a higher duty to give out
information ... if there is a sufficiently important interest to protect").
112. Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1962) (stating that patient possesses a limited
right against such disclosure, subject to exceptions prompted by the supervening interest of society).
113. Case law that has allowed for breaches of doctor-patient confidentiality has done so after
determining that the release of the information would be an overall public benefit. See supra notes
64-110 and accompanying text.
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warn far outweighs the physician's duty of confidentiality to the patient.'14
However, the question of whether the existence of AIDS rises to the
level of supervening public interest, should be considered in the context
of current exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality.
A.

Legal Basis
In an effort to protect physicians from unlimited liability, courts and
legislatures began to recognize exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality. Statutes granting physicians the ability to disclose patient information largely derive from a state's need to protect its citizens. Common
law exceptions range from a narrow duty to disclose in the context of
contagious diseases to a broader duty in the context of mental illness.
1. Statutory Exceptions to Confidentiality
In the early 20th century, state legislatures began to recognize exceptions
to physician-patient confidentiality through mandatory disclosure or "reporting" statutes. Reporting statutes actually require physicians to breach
the confidentiality of patients by reporting certain diagnosed conditions
to a designated authority."' Such statutes direct physicians to report a
variety of medical treatments ranging from evidence of child abuse" 6 to
communicable diseases." 7 Failure to report these conditions may result
in criminal sanctions against the physician." 8
Because reporting statutes conflict with the requirement of physicianpatient confidentiality, the United States Supreme Court has had the
opportunity to address the constitutionality of medical reporting laws." ' 9
In Whalen v. Roe, 20 the Court held that a New York statute, which
required physicians to report to the state the names and addresses of all
persons receiving prescriptions for various drugs, was not a violation of
privacy or liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 2' In upholding the legislation, the Court applied the rational basis test, according

114. See, e.g., Sten L. Gustafson, No Longer the Last to Know: A Proposal for Mandatory
Notification of Spouses of HIV Infected Individuals, 29 Hous. L. REv. 991, 1023 (1992).
115. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120980(i) (West Supp. 1996) (mandating compliance
with federal reporting requirements regarding AIDS, HIV, and their probable causative agents).
116. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1995) (mandating disclosure when a
physician has a reasonable suspicion that a child is an abused or a neglected child).
117. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (requiring physician to promptly
notify the district health officer whenever he knows that any person is sick with any disease dangerous
to the public health); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 381.0031 (Harrison 1993) (requiring physicians to
immediately report the existence of a disease of public health significance to state health department);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE ANN. § 81.042 (West 1992) (requiring disclosure of a suspected case
of a reportable disease and all information known concerning the person who has or is suspected
of having the disease).
118. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 384.24, 384.34 (Harrison 1993) (failing to report a case of
AIDS, ARC, or HIV is punishable by a maximum fine of $500 and notification of the physician's
state licensing agency); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 34.07 (West 1992) (failing to report
a "reportable disease or health condition" is punishable as a Class B misdemeanor).
119. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 596-97.
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to which laws are to be upheld if they are reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest. 22 The Court pointed out that "disclosures of
private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance
companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential part of
modern medical practice

....

"123

The Court relied on the statutory

reporting requirements concerning venereal disease as a specific example.
Thus, subject to an overriding provision that the statutes provide safeguards against the improper disclosure of confidential information, the
constitutionality will be upheld.124
As a result, some states have attempted to meet the need for public
health information by enacting mandatory reporting statutes for sexually
transmitted diseases and AIDS, while also attempting to protect confidentiality by including extensive confidentiality provisions. 125 Such statutes
allow physicians, or other authorities having the confidential information,26
to disclose the information only to certain listed individuals and agencies.1
Such states ensure enforcement of confidentiality provisions by mandating
27
criminal sanctions. 1
California and New York have the most progressive HIV reporting
statutes. Similar to other states' reporting statutes, New York and California statutes provide a list of individuals and agencies that may receive
AIDS-related information about a patient. 2 Both states also allow physicians to warn spouses or sexual partners of a patient with AIDS if the
physician reasonably believes such third parties to be in danger of contracting the disease. Unlike other states with this specific exception,

See id.
Id. at 602.
See Whalen 429 U.S. at 598-600.
See id.
126. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1603.1 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 384.25(3)
(Harrison Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-22-9.2 (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, para. 310,
§ 4(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
127. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120980 (West Supp. 1996) (negligent violation
results in civil penalty not to exceed $1000, while willful violation results in penalty not to exceed
$10,000 or a year in jail or both); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 381.004(6)(b) (Harrison Supp. 1994) (violation
is a 2nd degree misdemeanor); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-22-9.2(o) (1991) (violation results in misdemeanor);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, para. 305, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (intentional or reckless violation is a
Class A misdemeanor punishable between $1000-$5000); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2783(2) (McKinney
1993)(willful violation is a misdemeanor).
128. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 120985-121015 (West Supp. 1996) (listing the patient's
spouse, sexual partner, needle sharer, and the county health officer as authorized recipients of test
results); N.Y. Pu. HEALn LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1993) (listing those eligible to receive confidential
HIV-related information as including the health facility or health care provider administering health
care to the infected individual, a health officer, and an authorized agency in connection with foster
care or adoption of a child); accord FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 381.004(3)(f) (Harrison Supp. 1990) (listing
health care providers, health facilities providing organ transplant and semen donor services, and
other persons allowed access by court order as eligible to receive HIV information); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 111 2,para. 7309 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (listing health care providers, health facilities providing
organ transplant and semen donor services, and law enforcement officials coming in direct contact
with the individual's blood or bodily fluids as eligible to receive HIV information); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.1-36.1 (Michie Supp. 1992) (listing health care providers, health facilities providing organ and
semen donor services, and persons allowed access by court order as eligible to receive HIV test
information).
122.
123.
124.
125.
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however, New York and California make the exception optional, with
explicit shielding provisions for physicians who choose not to warn a
third party in danger of infection from the physician's patient. 129 The
New York statute states that "no criminal sanction or civil liability" can
be imposed against a physician for failing to disclose or for disclosing
in good faith. 130 The California statute provides the same protection, but
extends this authorization to county health officers as well. 3 ' Other states
have provided physicians with the authorization to disclose to a spouse
or sexual partner, but have not extended explicit immunization from
liability. 132
The Supreme Court has not dealt with the constitutionality of laws
requiring the reporting of AIDS or HIV infection. Given the Court's
use of the rational basis test in Whalen v. Roe, it is probable that state
laws requiring the reporting of AIDS and even HIV infection will be
upheld as long as confidentiality is preserved. While reporting statutes
may not be necessary for stemming the spread of AIDS, such laws are
reasonably related to slowing the spread of AIDS.
2. Common Law Exceptions to Confidentiality
Courts have also recognized exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality based upon a duty to protect public health. Courts have found
an affirmative duty to act for the protection of non-patients of a physician
in two contexts: where a patient with a contagious disease is likely to
spread the disease to others 13 and where a mental health patient threatens
harm to another person. 134 The contagious disease cases recognize a

129. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(c) (West Supp. 1996); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2782(4)(a)(2) (McKinney 1993).
130. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2783(3)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1993).
131. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015 (West. Supp. 1996).
132. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 381.703 (Harrison Pamp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-229.2(g) (Michie 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, para. 305, § 9(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
133. See Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a duty towards
specific persons at specific risk of infection); Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884)
(holding a physician liable for the negligent spreading of a contagious disease); Davis v. Rodman,
227 S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921) (holding that physicians attending patients afflicted with contagious diseases
have a duty to exercise reasonable care to advise family members likely to be exposed); Skillings
v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919) (holding that physician had a duty to warn parents of possibility
of infectious transmission); Edwards v. Lamb, 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899) (holding that physician had
a duty to warn spouse of danger of infection); Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928) (holding
physician liable to a third party in proximity to his contagious patient).
134. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) where court recognized
duty towards intended victims who were readily identifiable); Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a patient's psychotherapist had a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect an identifiable victim from harm); Lipari v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 497
F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) (holding relationship between psychotherapist and his patient gives
rise to affirmative duty to initiate whatever precautions are reasonably necessary to protect potential
victims of his patient); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that a
therapist had a duty to protect an intended or potential victim of his patient); Petersen v. State,
671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983) (where psychiatrist of a diagnosed schizophrenic had a duty to take
reasonable precautions to protect a person foreseeably at danger).
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narrower exception to physician-patient confidentiality,' while the3 6 more
recent mental health cases seem to support a broader exception.'
a. Contagious Disease Cases
As early as 1884, a federal circuit court heard a case concerning the
negligent spreading of a contagious disease. 3 7 In Smith v. Baker,' the
defendant took his children to a boarding house when they had the
contagious disease whooping cough. 3 9 The children ended up exposing
the plaintiff's child and children of other boarders to the disease.'14 At
that time, the accusation that someone was infected with a contagious
disease could be actionable as slander; yet the negligent spread of a
disease among animals could also result in liability. 14 The Smith court
held that the plaintiff's suit could be actionable42 and upheld the jury's
decision of negligence on the defendant's part.
Soon thereafter, Edwards v. Lamb 43 became the first case to recognize
a physician's potential liability for failing to warn a non-patient of the
danger posed by a patient. In Edwards, a wife employed a physician to
treat her husband for a wound, which became an infectious sore. During
the treatment, the physician asked the wife to assist in dressing the
wound.' 4 The physician, knowing that there was danger of infection,
nonetheless assured the wife that she was perfectly safe. 145 The wife relied
on his advice and subsequently became infected.1'4 The court stated that
"the fact that [the physician's] duty, as to [the wife], was merely to
advise, and not administer treatment, is immaterial," and held the physician negligent . 4 By doing so, the court recognized that the lack of
physician-patient relationship was not necessarily a bar to recovery.
Similarly, in Skillings v. Allen, 48 a mother alleged that a physician
had wrongfully advised her that she might safely visit her child, who
was hospitalized with scarlet fever, with no risk of infection. 49 Not only
was the child at the most infectious stage when she visited, but the
physician also told the mother that she could safely return to her home
without risk of spreading the infection. 150 The Minnesota Supreme Court

135. See, e.g., Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d at 954 (refusing to expand duty beyond special
relationship).
136. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d at 511-12 (holding that physician had broad duty
to protect foreseeable victim).
137. See Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 709.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 709-10.
142. Id. at 710.
143. 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899).
144. Id. at 480.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 480.
148. 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919).
149. Id. at 663.
150. Id.
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stated that a person "is responsible for the direct consequences of his
negligent acts whenever he is placed in such a position with regard to
another that it is obvious that if he does not use due care in his own
conduct he will cause injury to that person.""'' Because both parents
eventually contracted scarlet fever a§ a result of the exposure, the court
held that the physician breached his duty to use due care in telling the
patient's mother about the possibility of an infectious transmission.152
Shortly thereafter, the Arkansas Supreme Court sustained a dismissal
of a complaint alleging negligence in the treatment of typhoid patients.' 53
In Davis v. Rodman, 5 4 the court found for the physicians involved because
the complaint did not allege specific acts and facts showing proximate
cause; yet the court did find that a duty to prevent the spread of infection
existed. The court held that a physician owes a duty to those persons
who do not know that the patient's disease is contagious, and to those
who are likely to come in contact with the patient, to instruct and advise
them of the character of the disease.' 5 5 Like the Skillings court, the Davis
court recognized the physician's duty to immediate family members of
the patient. However, the Davis court went further, in that it acknowledged
56
the existence of an affirmative duty of physicians to warn patients.'
Unlike Skillings, where the physician was liable for his negligent advice,
in Davis the court recognized the potential liability of a physician who
negligently fails to warn.
New York recognized a physician's liability to family members in 1959. 51
In Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America,18 a wife brought an action
against a physician, who was employed by her husband's employer, for
failing to inform her that her husband was suffering from tuberculosis. 5 9
The court held that the physician "could have reasonably anticipated
that the [husband], without knowledge of his contagious disease, would
not take the precautionary measures necessary to prevent infecting others,
including his wife, with the germs of the disease."'6 The court relied
on a treatise which extended "the duty of a physician who is attending
a patient afflicted with a contagious disease to exercise care in advising
and warning members of the family and others who are liable to exposure
... from the disease.' 6' Although the court relied on language that
expanded the duty to those outside the immediate family, 62 the court
did not have the opportunity to decide whether that language applied.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 663-64.
Davis v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921).
at 612.
id. at 613.
Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
at 352.
at 358.
(quoting 70 C.J.S.
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48, at 970).
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The facts of the case apparently limited the physician's duty to warn
only to the patient's wife, because she was the only one likely to become
infected from the disease.
Some time later, in Hofmann v. Blackmon, 63 a minor who lived with
his father brought an action against a physician for failure to warn him
of the nature of his father's contagious disease and advise him of the
precautionary steps necessary to prevent contracting the disease. The
physician attempted to distinguish previous cases finding a duty to warn
immediate family members because, *unlike physicians in those cases, he
failed to correctly diagnosis his patient with a contagious disease.' 64 The
Florida District Court of Appeals held that once a doctor diagnoses a
patient as having a contagious disease, the doctor has the duty to use
reasonable care in advising and warning family members of the contagious
nature of the patient's illness. 65 This duty to warn was not negated by
the physician's failure to correctly diagnose the disease, because to apply
such logic would "reward the doctor for failing to discover that which
. . [may have been] his duty to discover."' l Thus, even if a physician
fails to determine that a contagious disease exists, she may still owe a
duty to immediate family members if a reasonable physician would have
167
diagnosed the contagious disease.
Some jurisdictions have considered whether to expand a physician's
liability beyond immediate family members. In Jones v. Stanko, 16a the
estate of a neighbor brought an action against the physician of a smallpox
patient after the neighbor contracted the disease and died. 69 The Ohio
Supreme Court held that when a physician holds himself out as qualified
concerning a matter, he must exercise ordinary skill and care relative to
that matter. 70 Ordinary care necessarily included giving notice of the
contagious nature of a patient's disease to those persons who are in
proximity to the patient. 7 ' Additionally, a doctor could be held liable
to a third party for any injury to the third party resulting from the
doctor's failure to notify. 72 Thus, the court not only recognized an
affirmative duty to warn, they also expanded that duty to those in close
73
proximity to the patient.
*

163. Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 245 So. 2d 257 (Fla.
1971).
164. Id. at 753.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.;
accord Fosgate v. Corona, 330 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1974) (holding that a physician may
be liable to the relatives who contract a disease from the patient following the physician's failure
to diagnose the disease).
168. 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928).
169. Id. at 456.
170. Id. at 458.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id.;
accord Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (holding that a breach of confidentiality
outside the family to those in reasonable danger and likely to contract the disease from the patient
was justified).
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More recently, third parties have attempted to expand a physician's
duty even further to those who are reasonably foreseeable. In Gammill
v. United States, 7 4 the friends of a hepatitis patient who subsequently
contracted hepatitis as well brought a cause of action against the patient's
physician for failure to report the disease to public health.' 75 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the previous contagious disease cases
to support the fact that "[a] physician may be found liable for failing
to warn a patient's family, treating attendants, or other persons likely
to be exposed to the patient, of the nature of the disease and the danger
of exposure.'

' 76

However, the court declined to extend the duty any

further and suggested a special relationship must exist between the physician and those to be warned. This special relationship required that
"at the bare minimum the physician must be aware of the specific risks
' ' 77
to specific persons before a duty to warn exists."
The contagious disease cases clearly support a physician's duty to warn
a patient's immediate family of the dangers of contacting the patient's
contagious disease. The duty extends to a physician even if the physician
fails to correctly diagnosis the disease as contagious. Moreover, after
Stanko and Simonsen, it was unclear whether this duty extends only to
"those who are in proximity to a patient's contagious disease,'

1

78

or to

anyone who is reasonably foreseeable. After Gammill, however, it is clear
that a physician's duty extends only to immediate family members or
specific persons in close proximity to the patient.
b. Cases Involving the Mentally Ill
In 1976, the California Supreme Court took steps toward expanding
the duty derived from the contagious disease cases when it decided
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.79 The case involved a
voluntary out-patient who informed his therapist that he was going to
kill "an unnamed girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana [Tarasoff], when
she returned home from spending the summer in Brazil." 80 The therapist
failed to take any action to warn Ms. Tarasoff or the campus police.
Shortly after Tatiana's return from Brazil, the patient went to her residence
and stabbed her to death.' 8' Her estate brought an action against the
therapist and the university, his employer, for breach of duty to warn
a foreseeable victim of the danger posed by a threatening patient.
In its decision, the California Supreme Court recognized the duty of
a psychotherapist to use reasonable care to protect a third party from
harm when the therapist has notice that his patient presents a serious

174. 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1984).
175. Id. at 952.
176. Id. at 954.
177. Id.
178. Stanko, 160 N.E.2d at 458.
179. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
180. Id. at 341.
181. Id.
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danger of violence to that intended victim.1

2

The court relied on the

Restatement (Second) of Torts to impose a duty upon a professional to
act where a "special relationship" exists with another person, imposing
either a duty to control the other party or to protect that party from
a known danger. 18 3 Previous California cases, however, involved defendants who were in a special relationship with both the victim and the
person who created the danger. Thus, the court cited to the string of
contagious disease cases for the contention that the physician-patient
relationship "is sufficient to support the duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect others against the dangers emanating from the patient's illness. "184 Applying this contention, the court held that although the
therapist had no "special relationship" to the victim, the therapist's
relationship to his patient was sufficient under the circumstances to create
15
a duty to use reasonable care to protect the known intended victim.

In the words of the court, "[s]uch a relationship [psychotherapist-patient]
81 6
may support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons."'
The Tarasoff court acknowledged that its holding extended then-existing
precedent. The court noted that the foreseeability of harm to the third
person was the most important consideration in establishing the existence
of a duty to warn. 8 7 The court, however, failed to define the parameters
of this duty. After Tarasoff, it is unclear whether the duty extends only
to warn readily identifiable victims or more broadly to prevent harm to
those reasonably foreseeable. Consequently, other jurisdictions have attempted to clarify the ambiguities as to whom and when a therapist owes
8
duty to warn.

In 1979, New Jersey became the first state to expand the Tarasoff
duty to warn. 8 9 McIntosh v. Milano'90 involved a patient who disclosed
his possessive feelings toward a young woman to his therapist. 19' On one
occasion, the patient disclosed that he had fired a B.B. gun at the
woman's (or her boyfriend's) car, because he was upset that she was
going on a date with her boyfriend. 92 The patient eventually shot the
young woman. 193

182. Id. at 340.
183. Id. at 343.
184. Id. at 344.
185. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343.
186. Id.
187. Id.at 342.
188. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 738 (Cal. 1980) (limiting the duty to
a named or readily identifiable victim or group of victims); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497
F. Supp. 185, 194 (D. Neb. 1980) (adopting a duty on a therapist to any person foreseeably
endangered by the negligent treatment of a psychiatric patient); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500,
511-12 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1979) (expanding duty to protect an intended or potential victim of the
patient); Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (Wash. 1993) (establishing a duty to take reasonable
precautions to protect a person foreseeably at danger).
189. See McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1979).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 503.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 504.
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The McIntosh court held that a "therapist may have a duty to take
whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect an intended or potential
victim of his patient."'' 94 The duty arises when the therapist knows, or
should have known, in accordance with the standards of the profession,
that the patient may pose a danger to the victim. 195 The court said that
the relationship giving rise "to [this] duty may be [based] either [on the
special relationship which exists] between the therapist and [his] patient
... or [on the broader duty a physician] may have to protect the welfare
of the community, which is analogous to the [duty] to warn" in contagious
disease cases. 19 Thus, the court expanded the therapist's obligation from
a narrow duty to warn to a broad duty to take whatever measures are
necessary to protect the foreseeable victim. 97
A 1980 federal district court case, Lipari v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,'91
applying Nebraska law, extended a therapist's duty to warn far beyond
those persons who may be identifiable to the therapist. In Lipari, an expsychiatric patient fired a shotgun into a crowded night club, killing one
person and wounding another.'9 Even though the victims were not identifiable to the therapist, the court held the therapist's employer liable
because the harm was foreseeable. 200 Like the Tarasoff and McIntosh
courts, the Lipari court drew an analogy to contagious diseases. 20 1 Thus,
under Lipari, where a therapist knows or should know that a patient's
dangerous propensities pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others, he
must take whatever precautions are reasonably necessary to protect potential victims.
During the same year, in Thompson v. Alameda, 20 2 the California
Supreme Court attempted to put limitations on the ambiguous Tarasoff
interpretations. 20 3 The court read Tarasoff to require that intended victim
be "readily identifiable" as a precondition to liability. 20 4 The narrow
interpretation of Tarasoff restricted the duty to warn to those instances
in which protection was appropriate for specifically named or readily
identifiable victims. The court found no liability because no specific child
was threatened.
Unlike the contagious disease cases, which refused to extend a physician's liability beyond specific, readily identifiable people, the mental
illness cases suggest that a duty is owed to anyone who is reasonably
foreseeable. Thus, it appears that two entirely different theories have

194. McIntosh, 403 A.2d at 511-12.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 512.
197. See id.;see also Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 238-39 (Or. 1983).
198. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
199. Id. at 187.
200. Id. at 195.
201. See id.at 190.
202. 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
203. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (setting forth disparaging interpretations of
Tarasof/).
204. See Thompson, 614 P.2d at 734.
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developed establishing a physician's duty to third parties. The contagious
disease cases support the proposition that a physician may only be held
to a duty to warn specific people in close proximity to the patient. Thus,
the contagious disease cases could provide support for a duty to warn
a spouse or sexual partner in the context of HIV. The mental illness
cases, however, support a broader duty to warn anyone who foreseeably
may be injured. Thus, under the mental illness cases, a physician could
potentially be held liable to any person whom the patient may expose
to the virus.
IV.

NEW MEXICO LAW

New Mexico currently recognizes a duty to maintain physician-patient
confidentiality. 2 5 Additionally, like other jurisdictions, the New Mexico
legislature as well as New Mexico courts have provided specific exceptions
to physician-patient confidentiality .2 Exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality, however, are especially broad or ill-defined in New Mexico. 20 7
The question of whether a physician in New Mexico could be liable for
disclosures of HIV related information to foreseeable third parties requires
an analysis of the exceptions to physician-patient confidentiality in the
state.
A.

Physician-PatientConfidentiality in New Mexico
New Mexico, like other jurisdictions, has recognized a duty to maintain
a patient's confidentiality concerning medical information. 20 8 In New
Mexico, the Public Health Act (PHA) states that the "files and records
of the department giving identifying information about individuals who
have received or are receiving from the department, treatment, diagnostic
services or preventive care for disease, disabilities, or physical injuries,
are confidential and are not open to inspection." 209 Further, violation
of the PHA is a petty misdemeanor subject to a fine, jail sentence, or
both.210 As written, the PHA implies a broad duty of confidentiality.
The statute fails to specifically define what comprises diseases, disabilities
or physical injuries. Presumably, AIDS would fall within the definition
of diseases for the purposes of this statute.

205. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-20 (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (establishing disclosure of information
relating to individuals who have received medical services as a misdemeanor).
206. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (mandating reporting to public health
officials of individuals "sick with any disease dangerous to the public health"); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-2B-6 (A)-(H) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (excepting various disclosures of test results from confidentiality); Wilchinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989) (mandating disclosure of
confidential patient information to third parties foreseeably at risk by patient's behavior).
207. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-6 (A)-(H) (permitting potential disclosure to the health and
environment department, various qualifying health care providers, and insurance agents among
others).
208. See Public Health Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-20.
209. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-20(A).
210. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-20(F); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-21 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
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The New Mexico legislature has also recognized the heightened importance of confidentiality in the context of HIV by specifically enacting
a statute relating to HIV information and testing. 2 1 The Human Im-

munodeficiency Virus Tests Act (HIV Act) states that "no person or the
person's agents or employees who require or administer the [HIV] test
shall disclose the identity of any person upon whom a test is performed,
or the result of such a test in a manner which permits the identification
of the subject of the test.

' 21 2

Because HIV-related information clearly

falls within the confidential medical information statute, the same criminal
sanctions apply.
Through both the PHA and the HIV Act, the New Mexico legislature
has recognized the importance of protecting the privacy of AIDS-related
information. Additionally, the state health department has recognized the
importance of patient confidentiality by providing for anonymous testing
in New Mexico. Because a patient's identity is never disclosed, anonymous
testing ensures the highest level of confidentiality during testing. Insurance
of confidentiality, in turn, helps alleviate fears of discrimination and
ostracism, which affect the state's ability to provide effective HIV testing
and preventative services.
Exceptions to Physician-PatientConfidentiality in New Mexico
Like other jurisdictions, New Mexico has codified exceptions to phy213
sician-patient confidentiality, both generally and in the context of HIV.
Although the HIV Act provides for many disclosures, the statute is silent
concerning whether a physician can disclose information to spouses or
sexual partners. Moreover, New Mexico courts have not had much opportunity to interpret the HIV Act. New Mexico has, however, adopted
a Tarasoff duty. 21 4 Currently physicians in New Mexico are subject to
25
a balancing test to determine whether a duty towards third parties exists. 1
B.

1. New Mexico Statutory Law
Although both sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS presumably fall
within the ambit of New Mexico's broad medical records statute, the
legislature has allowed specific exceptions for both of these diseases that
allow for reporting to public health officials. 216 For example, the PHA
requires any physician, superintendent or manager of a clinic or penal
institution that makes a diagnosis or treats a case of a sexually transmitted
disease to report the information to the district health officer in the

211. See Human Immunodeficiency Virus Tests Act, N.M.
Pamp. 1994).
212. N.M. STAT. ANN.

213.
214.
215.
216.

See
See
Id.
See

STAT. ANN.

§§ 24-2B-6 to -8 (Repl.

§ 24-2B-6.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-6 (A)-(H).
Wilchinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989).
at 515, 775 P.2d at 717.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-7 (Repl Pamp. 1994); N.M. STAT.

ANN.

§ 24-2B-6.

Summer 19961

PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO WARN ABOUT HIV

HIV Act
district in which they are located. 1 7 Similarly, New Mexico's
218
mandates disclosure to the Public Health Department.
Unlike the PHA, however, the HIV Act provides an extensive list of
individuals and other agencies that may also receive information concerning HIV. 21 9 Most of these exceptions recognize the public policy
interest in acquiring additional epidemiological data. To prevent further
disclosure, whenever a disclosure is made pursuant to the HIV Act, a
statement must
written statement must accompany the disclosure. 22The
0
indicate the confidential nature of the information.
Although the PHA does not contain an extensive list of exceptions,
it does provide physicians with an important exception that the HIV Act
does not. 22' The PHA expressly permits a physician to breach confidentiality when the physician believes that the patient may act in such a
way as to harm third parties.2 22 The statute states that:
any attending physician [who] knows or has good reason to suspect
that a person having a sexually transmitted disease may conduct himself
so as to expose other persons to infection, [the physician] shall notify

217. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-7.
218. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-6(D).
219. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-6. The HIV Act allows exceptions to the following persons:
A. the subject of the test or the subject's legally authorized representative, guardian
or legal custodian;
B. any person designated in a legally effective release of the test results executed
prior to or after the test by the subject of the test or the subject's legally authorized
representative;
C. an authorized agent, a credentialed or privileged physician or employee of a
health facility or health care provider if the health care facility or health care
provider itself is authorized to obtain the test results, the agent or employee provides
patient care or handles or processes specimens of body fluids or tissues and the
agent or employee has a need to know such information;
D. the health and environment department . . . and the centers for disease control
of the United States public health service in accordance with reporting requirements
for a diagnosed case of acquired immune deficiency syndrome;
E. a health facility or health care provider which procures, processes, distributes
or uses:
(1) a human body part from a deceased person, with respect to medical information
regarding that person;
(2) semen provided prior to the effective date of the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Test Act for the purpose of artificial insemination;
(3) blood or blood products for transfusion or injection; or
(4) human body parts for transplant with respect to medical information regarding
the donor or recipient;
F. health facility staff committees or accreditation or oversight review organizations which are
conducting program monitoring, program evaluation or service reviews so long as any identity
remains confidential;
G. authorized medical or epidemiological researchers who may not further disclose any identifying
characteristics or information; and
H. for purposes of application or reapplication for insurance coverage, an insurer or reinsurer
upon whose request the test was performed.
Id.
220. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-7.
221. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
222. See id.
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the district health officer of the 22name and address of the diseased
person and the facts of the case. 1
By using the word "shall" in the statute, the legislature required physicians
to warn of suspicious conduct.
Although a physician is required to disclose suspicious conduct of a
patient under the PHA, the legislature removed some of the burden upon
physicians by requiring them to notify only the public health officer of
suspicious conduct. Thus, the PHA does not require a physician to
determine whether the suspicious conduct will, in fact, endanger others
or to determine who specifically may be in danger by the conduct. The
statute places the burden on the district health officer, who presumably
has sufficient education and training to determine the level of dangerousness involved with certain conduct. 224
Unlike the PHA, the HIV Act does not contain a provision that
requires a physician to report patients whom the physician feels may be
acting unethically. In fact, the HIV Act specifically states that "no person
... may disclose the test results to another person except as authorized
by [the HIV Act]. ' 2 25 By not explicitly including exceptions to confidentiality, it appears that the legislature intentionally decided not to
impose a duty towards third parties, permissive or otherwise, on physicians
in the context of HIV or AIDS.
2. New Mexico Common Law
The New Mexico Supreme Court has only recently addressed the question of whether a physician has a duty to third persons who foreseeably
may be harmed as a result of a physician's negligent treatment. 226 Wilchinsky v. Medina227 involved a physician who administered drugs to a
patient in his office. 228 The drugs were narcotics, which cloud a person's
judgment and physical abilities and create a risk to that person if he or
she drives a car.229 Shortly after receiving the drugs, the patient left the
office and was involved in a serious car accident involving a third party. 2 0
The third party suffered injuries from the accident and brought suit
against the physician. 23 The court held that the physician owed a duty
23 2
to the driving public when he administered drugs to his patients.
Like the California Supreme Court in Thompson, 233 the New Mexico
Supreme Court interpreted the holding of Tarasoff narrowly by stating
that a physician has a duty to warn when a specific, identifiable third

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
See id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-7.
See Wilchinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989).
Id.
See id.at 511, 775 P.2d at 713.
Id.at 512, 775 P.2d at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 515, 775 P.2d at 717.
See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
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party is known to the physician. 23 4 Thus, when the Wilchinsky court
recognized a physician's duty towards third parties who may be foreseeably
the court not only adopted the Tarasoff rationale, but expanded
injured,
it. 235 In its determination, the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on a
balancing test set forth in an Illinois case. 23 6 The factors to be balanced
are: "the likelihood of injury, the reasonableness of the burden of
guarding against it, and the consequences of burdening the defendant. ' 237
The balancing of the factors in this case indicated that the physician
owed a duty towards third parties.
New Mexico courts have yet to decide a cause of action brought by
a third party against a patient's physician in the context of AIDS. After
Wilchinsky, it is likely courts will extend the balancing test to all suits
involving a physician's duty towards third parties, including HIV/AIDS
related cases. However, given the increased implications in the context
of AIDS, it is unclear how courts will interpret a physician's duty towards
third parties.
V.

A PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES IN NEW
MEXICO IN THE CONTEXT OF HIV/AIDS

Under New Mexico law, physicians who fear their HIV-infected patient
may expose third parties to the disease are forced to chose between two
alternatives: 1) breaching physician-patient confidentiality and 2) failing
to warn third parties potentially at risk from the patient's behavior.
However, each alternative could potentially lead to liability. On the one
hand, spouses and sexual partners are not specifically included under
exceptions to confidentiality in the HIV Act, which implies that physicians
must maintain strict confidentiality even if confronted with a patient who
the physician feels may endanger third parties. As a result, a physician
who warns a spouse or sexual partner of a HIV-infected person will
likely be held liable to the patient for breach of confidentiality under
the HIV Act.
On the other hand, because New Mexico has already applied the
Wilchinsky balancing test to determine a physician's duty towards a third
party after administering drugs to a patient, it is likely that the courts
will extend the balancing test to a case involving a physician who breaches
a patient's confidential serological status in favor of warning a third
party. However, it is unclear what the result will be if courts do apply
the test. The legislature's failure to specifically address the conflict between
confidentiality and duty to warn creates ambiguities as to whether the
physician could be equally liable to the spouse or sexual partner for
failing to warn.

234. Wilchinsky, 108 N.M. at 515, 775 P.2d at 717.
235. See id.
236. Id. (citing Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 (111. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1987)).
237. Id.
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A.

Expansion of Tarasoff-type Duty in New Mexico
Cases in other jurisdictions lead to the conclusion that a physician
may be held liable for failing to warn those in close proximity to a
patient with a contagious disease 238 or to those who may be foreseeably
injured by a patient's conduct. 23 9 New Mexico recently indicated that
physicians may have a duty to warn those who may be foreseeably injured
based upon a balancing test. 240 A determination of a physician's duty to
warn a foreseeable third party of a patient's HIV status, then, requires
a balancing of the factors set forth in Wilchinsky.
The first factor is the likelihood of injury to a third party. The likelihood
of HIV transmission depends on how broadly the term "third parties"
is interpreted. Because the only serious and immediate risk of HIV
transmission occurs through exchange of blood or sexual conduct, only
those third parties who share sexual relationships or who are exposed to
the blood of the patient have any likelihood of injury. Furthermore, only
those third parties who practice unsafe sex or share needles are at risk.
Thus, in the absence of flagrantly unscrupulous behavior, the likelihood
of injury to a third parties in general is low. However, the likelihood
of injury increases as the third party becomes more identifiable.
The second factor is the reasonableness of the burden of guarding
against the likelihood of injury. Guarding against transmission of HIV
is fairly routine in that it only requires a physician to inform a patient's
sexual partners or intravenous needle sharers of the dangers associated
with HIV and their potential risk of exposure through the patient. However, in order for a physician to inform third parties, the physician must
first ascertain the identities of a patient's sexual and drug partners.
Accordingly, this factor also depends on the classification of third parties.
A physician who treats one HIV-positive patient is known in the community for treating HIV and, thus, often has many HIV-positive patients.
All of these patients could have any number of sexual partners. Moreover,
patients are more likely to keep extramarital affairs, especially homosexual
affairs, and drug use hidden. The latency period of AIDS also causes
problems in that physicians are not able to narrow time frames significantly. The burden on the physician to guard against exposure to all
of these people is clearly high.
A definition of "third parties" limited to identifiable spouses, monogamous sexual partners or specific, identifiable needle sharers, decreases
the burden on physicians substantially. A physician can easily determine
the identity of a patient's spouse or monogamous sexual partner. Personal
information is often disclosed during treatment or is indicated on the
record. Once the burden of determining specific third parties is limited,
the physician can easily guard against transmission to third parties by

238. See supra notes
239. See supra notes
240. See Wilchinsky
197 and accompanying

133-169 and accompanying text.
171-195 and accompanying text.
v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989). See also supra notes 191text.

Summer 19961

PHYSICIAN'S

DUTY TO WARN ABOUT HIV

notifying them about the possibility of exposure and risk of infection.
The third factor involves the consequences of burdening physicians.
Imposing the entire burden upon physicians to locate potential sexual
partners or needle sharers is extremely unrealistic. To effectively warn
the required third parties, a physician would have to determine when the
patient first became infected. 241 Next, the physician must determine exactly
who the patient has potentially exposed to the virus over that time span
including the latency period before the patient realized that he or she
might be infected.
Finally, the physician would have to locate the required third parties.
This would often include tracking down one-night-stands, out-of-town
encounters, and, especially in the case of intravenous drug users, homeless
people. Such a rule would also put the physician in a potentially dangerous
situation by forcing him to confront people whose drug-use, sexuality,
or extramarital affairs are not public knowledge. Moreover, the physician
may then be responsible for ascertaining whom these third parties have
exposed, in order to protect himself from other third parties. Additionally,
there is the consideration that a patient may fail to disclose certain
information which may lead to a third party, causing a high rate of
error outside the physician's control.
Physicians required to locate third parties, especially when more than
one of their patients is HIV-positive, would spend all of their time trying
to warn third parties. A patient's ethical behavior is also extremely
subjective. Moreover, physicians may feel differently about certain behavior. Furthermore, most physicians are untrained in how to approach
the subject of confrontation, both with their patient and potential third
parties.
Balancing the three Wilchinsky factors indicates that the burden on
the physician is too high to impose a duty toward third parties, generally,
in the context of HIV/AIDS. The low likelihood of transmission is greatly
outweighed by the burden that would be imposed on the physician. The
balance is more even, however, when the class of third parties is narrowed
to specific, identifiable persons. The deciding factor, therefore, is the
unreasonableness of placing such a high burden on physicians, especially
when dealing with a complex, personal disease such as AIDS.
The New Mexico legislature recognized this burden when it provided
physicians with the ability to disclose unethical behavior concerning sexually transmitted diseases to the public health office. 242 Because public
health agents are neutral, and have experience and training in patient
behavior and counseling, they are better able to handle the burden.
Without such a procedure for AIDS physicians, the burden on physicians
would be too heavy to justify a duty to warn even specific, identifiable
third parties.

241. Determining the date of seroconversion creates difficulties, however, because often people
overlap into many high-risk groups.
242. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-8 (Repl..Pamp. 1994).
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Limits to Contagious Disease Expansion
The New Mexico courts have not had the opportunity to determine
whether a physician owes a duty to third parties in the context of
contagious diseases. Cases from other jurisdictions have determined that
a duty may be owed to third parties by a physician in the context of
contagious diseases.2 43 This duty is narrow and extends to family members
or other specific, identifiable third parties, which would necessarily only
include spouses or monogamous sexual partners in the context of AIDS.
HIV/AIDS, however, can be distinguished from the other contagious
diseases involved in these cases. The contagious disease cases are generally
characterized by the inability of the patient either to adapt his conduct
so as to avoid or minimize the risk of infection or to communicate
adequately to third parties the nature of the risk. Persons with AIDS
or people at risk for AIDS, on the other hand, have the ability to adapt
their behavior and either abstain from sex or engage in protected sex.
Additionally, all of the diseases that were the subject of these cases
were highly contagious. Such diseases involved airborne pathogens, which
allowed transmission through casual contact. HIV is only transmitted
through blood or bodily secretions resulting from particular types of
conduct. Thus, the diseases involved in the contagious disease cases created
a higher risk of transmission to a wider class of individuals than does
AIDS.
Furthermore, in Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America244 and Hofmann
v. Blackmon, 245 the sufferers were actually unaware of their conditions.
Often, as in Wojcik, the real complaint of the third party was that a
cure for the disease might have been sought in a timely fashion, had
the party been informed of the contagious condition of the patient. 246
Yet, with no cure for AIDS, a central traditional purpose of warning
disappears when it is likely that the third person has already contracted
the virus at the relevant point in time.
The diagnosis of HIV is less accurate, even after confirmatory testing,
than the diagnosis of most contagious diseases. 247 The existence of significant numbers of false positives, the spreading of unnecessary alarm,
and the resulting ostracism of the supposed sufferers are material factors
in the AIDS context.
These distinctions suggest that AIDS cannot easily and simply be
considered just another contagious disease for these purposes. People
exposed to many of the traditional forms of contagious diseases seek
help because of the highly debilitating effects of their illness. Their disease
status is more obvious and identifiable. By contrast, HIV positive people
may not be easily identifiable and may not even be aware of their own

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See
183
241
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 132-169.
N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
So. 2d 752 (Fla. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 245 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1970).
Wojcik, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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illness. These differences, combined with the need for essential testing
necessary to track the spread of the disease and to encourage more
responsible types of behavior from high risk groups, support the fact
that New Mexico courts will not predicate a duty towards third parties
based on the contagious disease cases.
CONCLUSION
Physicians in New Mexico have been left in limbo by uncertainties in
the law. On the one hand, if they breach confidentiality about an HIVpositive or AIDS patient's serological status, they face legal liability for
breach of confidentiality. On the other hand, if they maintain confidentiality, they risk liability for failure to warn an endangered third
party.
Possible causes of action against physicians for failing to warn in the
HIV/AIDS context will be predicated upon two grounds: 1) the Tarasofftype duty to foreseeable third parties who may be in danger; or 2) the
narrower duty based on the string of contagious disease cases. By applying
the balancing test set forth in Wilchinsky, it is clear that a Tarasofftype duty is unreasonable to impose upon a physician in the context of
AIDS in New Mexico. Moreover, the significant differences between
contagious diseases and AIDS, combined with the need to safeguard
against discrimination and to encourage volunteer testing, indicates that
the New Mexico courts will probably not recognize a physician's duty
towards third parties in general, or even specific, identifiable third parties,
in the context of AIDS.
Although New Mexico courts will probably not recognize a physician's
duty towards third parties in the context of AIDS, the New Mexico
legislature should take steps to clarify professional responsibilities in an
effort to provide direction and avoid potential litigation. The legislature
should continue to provide strong confidentiality safeguards because they
are advantageous to the public health. To clarify ambiguities, however,
the legislature should supplement safeguards with an authority, not a
duty, to breach patient confidence, but only if there is an identifiable
third party at serious and immediate risk of transmission by a sexual or
needle-sharing partner. Moreover, the physician should be authorized to
disclose suspicious conduct only to a trained public health official with
the experience to interpret and resolve potential conflicts. Narrowly limiting the class and removing the physician from the burden of disclosure
to third parties not only satisfies the Wilchinsky balancing approach, but
might also provide enough weight to impose a duty on physicians towards
to specific, identifiable third parties.
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